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Many farmers and ranchers are now facing severe financial stress. 
Since 1974, farm prices have been seriously disadvantageous to farmers. 
In these conditions, I accept the premise that farm prices are unaccep-
tably low. There seems to be some sentiment to come to the aid of 
farmers, but hard decisions must be made in the face of lack informa-
tion and a lot of misinformation. 
Goals of Farm Policy 
In the past, agricultural policy has been dictated too much by the 
political emergencies of the moment. A longer-term, more consistent 
approach is urgently needed. As a beginning, we assert that there are 
several legitimate goals of farm policy. Among appropri ate goals and 
purposes are at least the following: }j 
1. Abundant supplies and reasonable prices to consumer: ;Surely 
as a nation we want to perpetuate the great legacy of abundance that we 
1/ Testimony given at Senate Agricultural Corrmittee Hear"ings, 
May 22, 1978. 
~/ Professor and 
Loga n, Utah. 
Head, Department of Economics, Utah State University 
1/ Many of these are mentioned in Brandow, G. E., "Issues in Food 
and Agricultural Policy--An Evaluation of Policy Instruments," Paper 
presented at National Public Policy Education Conference, Zion, Illinois, 
September 15, 1976. As Brandow notes, some of these are conflicting, and 
opposing views arise. 
enjoy here. The vast productivity of agriculture has given us this 
invaluable position. Farm productivity has released the manpower and 
other resources from the farms so that we can enjoy the fruits of 
resource use in non-farm pursuits. 
2. Stability of market supplies and prices. The extreme 
sensitivity of agricultural markets to shifts in supply and demand 
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has led to risk and loss to producers, dissatisfaction of consumers, 
and reduced efficiency in farming and the food industry. A reasonable 
tas k is to bri ng more s tabi 1 i ty to rna rkets for food. It °i s reasonable 
to insulate from short-term swings in supplies or demands, but not 
possible or desirable to maintain II norrna l" prices only by use of 
storage plans in the face of long-term burgeoning surpluses or enduring 
scarci ty. 
3. Income enhancement for farmers. There seems to be some senti-
ment for helping farmers in their plight of low returns to their resources 
used in production. The question is complicated by some producers doing 
very well because of their great efficiency or low debt position or 
other factors, while many other farmers are for various reasons in 
danger of losing their equity. Serious arguments arise with respect to 
measures that would enhance the position of large vs. small producers 
and vice versa. 
4. Low cost for government agricu1tural programs. Payments, food 
stamps, administrative costs, and other items may be a considerable 
burden on taxpayers. Added inflation may result. Most everyone would 
agree on the desirability of minimizing government costs. 
5. Preservation of freedom of choice. The matter of individual 
freedom to respond to incentives and the option to choose among alterna-
tive courses of action are fundamental issues. Certainly, economists 
use as a model of efficiency the notion of perfect competition. While 
this is an abstraction that does not really exist, it is true that 
encumbrances or departures from perfect competition on the part of 
individual entrepreneurs reduce the efficiency of the economic system. 
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6. Aid to poor countries. Most Americans find it acceptable and 
desirable to share the abundance they have with less fortunate people. 
The more difficult question is how this is to be accomplished. It is by 
donations or subsidized sale, providing expertise to enhance their own 
system, or by direct financial aid to these people with which they can 
buy food or other items? 
7. Expansion of forei~gn markets. The United States has had a 
balance of payments problem, especially since the large oil i ports 
have become commonplace. Export of agricultural commodities has been 
a major off-setting factor. Farmers and the nation in total have a 
stake in market expansion. 
8. Provision of a storehouse for emergencies. It would seem that 
as rich as we are and as capable as we are of producing large quantities 
that this nation can well afford to stockpile more than a few weeks' of 
basic commodities. We have tended to view these as burdensome in the 
past, and their existence has depressed prices. Perhaps an attitudinal 
change is required to view a larger carryover as being desirable. That 
which is undesirable is continued build-up after an adequate storehouse 
is achieved. A storehouse is certainly consistent with stability; but, 
as it has been viewed in the past, it has been a serious depressant on 
commodity prices. 
9. Minimal adverse impact of commodity programs on other commodity 
producers. It is well known that high-feed grain prices are undesirable 
for livestock feeders, at least in the short run. It is eS~iential that 
one program does not disrupt and throw other programs into disarray. 
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With the preceding goals in mind, I would comment on particular 
provisions of SB 2626. It will be appropriate to mention each of several 
major aspects of the bill. 
COST OF PRODUCTION PRICE 
Since I was in graduate school in the late 1950's and early 1960's) 
the agricultural policy analysts have been discussing the long-run excess 
capacity to produce agricultural commodities in the U. S. Continuing 
indications have been given that agriculture would suffer if production 
went unchecked. 
In its simplest form, the problem of unacceptable farm commodity 
prices is a problem of excess supply. Frequently, it has been asserted 
that the laws of supply and demand are no longer working. Such is not 
the case. The results of the working of the laws are distasteful to some, 
but the system is working. 
Consider the following simple characterization of workings of supply 
and demand in Figure 1. Assume that price pp is deemed appropriate and 
acceptable as a goal for a particular commodity. Demand is depicted by 
DO, which indicates that as pr 'lces decrease, the quantity taken by consumers 
will increase. Supply is SS, which suggests that as price rises or as 
price is expected to rise, producers come forth with a larger' quantity 
of production. Supply and demand intersect such that price is P1 and 
quantity produced is Ql. Unfortunately, price P1 is well below the accepted 
goal. 
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Figure 1. Su pply and Demand- -Showing resul t ir1C] price and qllant i ty as well 
as pr ice goa l. 
The reason for the country's achieving the excess supply capacity 
is because of the vast productivity associated with improvement in tech-
nology. Seed, fertilizer, irrigation, better tillage through mechanization 
and other related factors have thrust American agriculture into a situa-
tion not common to other countries of the world. Efficient producers 
can continue to improve and lower costs of production to add to the capa-
city of the system. There are ineffective brakes on this giant machine 
since producers have no option but to continue to produce even more to 
try to cover at least the out-of-pocket costs of production. There may 
be little or no income left over to cover fixed costs such as is incurred 
by ownership of land or for other costs already sunk. These costs go 
on whether production takes place or not. Thus, farm producers are 
unlike other sectors of the economy. It would be foolish to expect 
farm machinery makers to bui ld so much machinery that prices fall and 
-- --- ~-. - -' -- .. ---------.~ . . _----._--- - ----- -_ . . _------------ - -_._ -------_ .. _ .... .. ~~-~--
machinery manufacturers produce themselves into bankruptcy. Most 
sectors have such control. Agriculture does not. Because of this 
difference, many would justify some program to stabi li ze anel support 
agriculture. 
Frequently, we have heard that farmers are producing their goods 
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at below the cost of pro duction. This has several possible interpreta-
tions, depending on which factors are included and whether we are t alking 
about the most efficient or least efficient producers. 
It is a misconception to suppose that a single figure on cost of 
production is applicable to all farmers. There are as many situations 
as there are farmers. In general, cost of production might be charac-
terized as in Figure 2. Each dot on the graph represents the average 
cost of production for a given farmer for a specific commodity for a 
particular year. Of course, in reality there are many more pl"oducers 
than dots on the graph . 
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figure 2. Average cost of production rel at ed to size of enterprise . 
There are many factors which affect costs~ certainly size of enter-
prise is one of them. The general relationship can be characterized as 
the line LAC. Let us assume that the average cost value for all these 
individuals is Cl . At this point~ about one-half of the producers can 
produce at a cost less than the average and one-half only at more than 
average. If it happened that the sale price was exactly at the average 
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of all producers' costs~ some would make money and some would lose. Some 
would want to increase their business because of the high profit potential 
and others would want to get out of the business or make some other 
change because they were losing money. The important thing is that any 
reasonable sale price will make some rich and some will become poor. If 
the price is high, more will become rich; if it is low, more will become 
poor. If sale price is established at a high level, then there are 
powerful incentives for many to increase production by many and diverse 
means. Some of these can be monitored and controlled while others cannot. 
A cost of production price has been indicated in S. B. 2626 as a 
kind of support or target price. With all of the problems mentioned 
above, it is perhaps worthwhile to list some standard data for a few 
areas. The Department of Economics, Utah State University, has a set of 
cos t da ta for 1977 (see Table 1) for se 1 ected crops in Utah .~!! The da ta 
from U. S. Department of Agriculture indicates that farm costs have been 
inflating at a rate of 7.6 percent per year from 1967 to 197?~ Assume 
.1/0avis, Lynn H., Stuart H. Richards~ and Rondo A. Chri~;tensen. 
"Enterprise Budgets for Farm and Ranch Planning in Utah~ " Economics Research 
Institute, Study Paper 77-7~ Utah State University~ August 1977, 13 pp. 
5/ 
- U. S. Department of Agriculture. "Agricultural Price5 ~" Washington, 
DC~ January 10, 1978. 
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I 1 
I I I 
I V 
J I 
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Alfalfa Ton 
Alfalfa Ton 
Alfalfd TOIl 
Alfa lfa Ton 
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Gu 
Cd r 1 ey l3u 
G t' a inC 0 r n 811 
Crai n Corn l3 u 
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Unit-1977 
36.77 
44 . ,1U 
1 . 34 
1.02 
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1 . J5 
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Cost icr 
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I .l / 
1 :: . 01 .' 
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I (, nd 
( fill i tjt: 
1 4 
10 
144 
\ 
'. J 
1 t~ :l 
l?U 
Cost Per 
Unit fo r 
Pro duction 1978 wi th 
I\"r Acre Land Ch arge 
4 . 5 70 . 49 
4 . 0 69 .71 
3.0 78.80 
2 . 5 83.24 
90.0 3.05 
80 . 0 3 .04 
65.0 3.35 
so.o 3.78 
lLiO . O 2 . 49 
100.0 2.B7 
20 . 0 19.25 
1 .0 19.14 
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Certain problems arise in this situation . Young farmer's find they 
cannot buy land, farm it, and payout on their investment. In mahy cases, 
the American dream of climbing the agricultural ladder to ownership is 
thwarted. On the other hand, if prices and incomes are boosted to where 
there is a substantial return to land in farming, there is some reason to 
expect a further bidding up of land prices to where again t here is a low 
imputed return to land. Much of the contention on whether incomes and 
return in agriculture are adequate revolves around the question of how 
returns on the land investment are handled. As an illustration, assume 
as in Table 1 that Class I irrigated land is selling at $1,800 per acre 
(Class II, III, and IV are assumed to be worth $1,500, $1,300, and $1,100, 
respectively). On the Class I land, 90 bushels per acre of barley can be 
grown. Costs of production other than for land are about $1.45 per bushel. 
If interest on the land is 8 percent, the investment cost is $144 per acre 
(1800 X 0.08). For each bushel, the land charge would be $1.60. What is 
the cost of production of barley, $1.45 or $3.05 per bushel? What is our 
goal on land ownership? Is it desirable to further push up land prices? 
These are unanswered questions. Certainly, there is a point that a young 
or beginning farmer must have returns to land in order to buy land. 
Government rate allowances for regulated public utilities certainly provide 
for a return to fixed investment regardless of whether their value is 
inflating. 
As further evidence on cost of production in the Western States, a 
Wyoming bulletin lists the costs of producing dryland wheat, including a 
land charge, as $3.29, $3.77, $4.53 for production of 30, 25, and 20 bushels 
10 
t · 1 6/ per acre, respec lve y.- These are values for 1975-76. These, too, are 
subject to inflation of 8 percent per year, or an increase to $3.85, 
$4.41, and $5.30, respedtively. The middle value of $4.41 would reflect 
the average production of 25 bushels per acre. 
In an Oregon bulletin, which also includes a land charge, the 1976 
cost is cited as $4.03 per bushel for dryland wheat. Again, applying the 
cost of inflation to bring this to the current year, the cost would be 
$4.72 per bushel.ZI 
Comparison of these examples of costs, the current parity prices, 
and the current market prices for commodities is in Table 2. Note 
particularly the discrepancy in grain prices and costs. Livestock prices 
are also a problem which leads to the general situation of low farm incomes. 
In considering the cost of production basis for pricing, it is inte-
resting to note the USDA production costs by region and the related 
projections by Doane Agricultural Service. As an example, the following 
data in Table 3 are cited. These data are for hard red winter wheat. 
Similar relationships exist for other commodities. 
Perhaps again the two most important aspects of this information are 
tha t 1 and cha rges a re a 1 arge component of the cos t of procluc~i on, and 
that as other costs may be lower in a certain region land costs tend to 
be high. Certainly one would expect a producer to pay more for land 
where he could produce at lower cost. 
~/D. E. Agee. "Costs of Producing Dryland Winter Wheat on Summer 
Fallow, Southeastern Wyoming, 1975-76," Bulletin 634, Extension Services, 
University of Wyoming, November 1975, p. 13. 
l/Cook, Gordon H. and A. Gene Nelson. IIEstimated Wheat Production 
and Marketing Costs in a 2,OOO-acre Dryland Farm, Oregon Columbia Plateau, 
1976," Oregon State University Extension Service, November 1976, p. 5. 
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Table 3. Projected Hard Red Winter Wheat Production Costs, 1978 
Central Sou thern Northern South-
Cost Item Unit Plains Plains Plains West 
Cost per acre, excluding 
land $ 65.90 72 . 47 61.03 143.42 
Current land charge/acre $ 32.13 25.86 43.45 70.96 
Yield per acre bu 26 ·.,8- 21. 1- 28.5- 59.2-
30.8 25.1 32.5 63.2 
Costs per bushel 
Total, excluding land $ 2.15-
2.45 
2.90-
3.42 
1 .89-
2.13 
2.28-
2.42 
Current land charge/ 
bushel $ 
Total, including 
land $ 
1 . 12 
3.27-
3.57 
1 . 12 
4.02 
4.54 
1 .42 
3.31 
3.55 
Source: Doane's Agricultural Report. Volume 41, No. 16, pp. 5,6. 
April 21,1978 (Western Edition) 
1 . 16 
3.44 
3.58 
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A final comment is that government regulation of public utilities 
certainly provides for a return on land and other fixed assets. Inheri-
tance tax provisions often force sale of land, so that beginning farmers 
must pay for land whether or not the farm was in the family. In the 
current situation we give somewhat favorable tax treatment to non-farmers 
to go into farming, but the price situation and government policy is ,I 
unfavorable for a farmer to begin on his own in farming. In summary, 
the question devolves to whether the policy should be to manipulate 
prices or incomes to an amount above the market equilibrium or not. My 
judgment is that we must do so by some means for stability and to protect 
a vital industry. The problem is how to do it most efficiently and 
equitably. With that we turn to the section on comments on production 
adjustment. 
Production Adjustment 
Alternatives to Supply Control 
The government could step in with price support payments to make up 
the price difference. This might involve direct government payments to 
farmers. It may be identified as a non-recourse loan at some target 
price. If the grower finds the market price below the loan rate, he 
turns the crop over to the government. The government thus accumulates 
a larger stock. The main objection is usually the government program 
cost and the complaint that the payments go to large growers. Further-
more, if price support payments (target prices, loan rates, or whatever) 
are ra i sed sign i fi cantly, the country faces the a 1 mas t certa -j n problem of 
unwieldy surpluses as well as continuing costly payments to farms. 
Another option is to disregard commodities altogether and simply make 
direct income 'payments to farmers. Thi s is a lot simpler and no more 
expensive, but generally held to be politically untenable. 
The second option is to work on increasing demand. In Figure 3, 
0'0 1 represents a new level of demand. At any gi ve n price, a larger 
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quantity will be taken than before. The price is forced up to the target 
at a larger quantity of use than formerly. The very great foreign demand 
for grains in 1973 was an example of the expanded dema nd anc favorable 
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price. Numerous programs, such as food stamps, school lunch subsidies, 
and other related attempts have sought to increase demand. These programs 
have met with only limited success, at best, as far as expanding farm 
markets is concerned. The basic reason is the inelasticity of the human 
stomach. The vast majority of Americans have ample food. Some diet 
--------------------------
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changes would be advisable, but demand expan8ion is severely limited. 
More success has been had in attempts of expanding foreign demand. Around 
the world, bellies are not full; but the countries where people are 
hungry are the same places where they cannot afford to buy food. Programs 
in ~ t~e past (P. L. 480) have sought to combine demand expansion with a 
price support program. Subsidized sales or gifts to poor countries were 
used to meet the twin objectives of feed i ng the starving and using up 
our own surpluses. Interestingly enough, recipient countries have not 
always been too pleased with receiving commodities, even as gifts, because 
of the uncertainty of continued availability and the tendency for local 
agricultural systems to relax when food is not critically short. Other 
countries producing for cash export markets have also complained of 
dumping and price undercutting. On balance, it seems prudent to have a 
stockpile which can be drawn on for emergency donations for short-term 
disasters. Other forms of help, such as technical assistance and loans, 
seem more suited to the development process. Certainly, it seems useful 
to attempt to develop stable and effective cash markets. 
A third option for effecting changes in price is to control supply. 
In figure 4, SIS' represents a new level of decreased supply. At any 
given price, a smaller quantity will be produced. Due to the relatively 
inelastic demands for many agricultural commodities (that is a relatively 
large change in price is associated with a relatively smaller proportional 
change in quantity), a small adjustment in supply often provides a 
substantial price change. Numerous efforts of voluntary sup ly control 
have taken place. Killing baby pigs, not planting part of the acres, 
dumping milki etc., have seldom, if ever, gotten beyond the publicity 
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stage. The reasons for the ineffectiveness of voluntary act'ions lie in 
the large number of producers who financial capacities to w-ithhold vary 
widely, whose commitment to a cause vary widely, and whose bankers have 
varying degrees of sympathy wi t h the program but a certain ;'nsistance 
on meeting the terms of loans. There just is not t he i ncentive to 
individuals to stick to a voluntary program where others can stand to 
gain more than the withholder if the non-participant goes right ahead 
with full production. 
The Conservation Reserve, Acreage Reserve, Set-Aside, and other 
programs have sought to control supply. A major problem is the tendency 
for poorest acreage to be diverted or set aside; and water, fertilizer, 
16 
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and other production inputs concentrated on remaining acreage so that 
production is not much affected. Most such programs have had a govern-
ment payment for the land taken out of production. This has usually 
evoked adverse comments on "payments for not producing" and a general 
wave of antagonism. 
A further possibility for supply control is to control imports. 
This option has a lot of sympathetic supporters. The difficulty is 
that restrictions on trade curb specialization and efficiency. Other 
countries cannot buy our products unless they sell us some things for 
currency. Some control of wide fluctuations is at least warranted. 
The SB 2626 proposal is for a set-aside that would control supply 
by requiring each producer to set aside a portion of his acreage in 
proportion to the national potential production which is not needed. 
There would be no government payment, only the supply contrac t ion would 
support prices. The government would only be charged with enforcing 
compliance. This would create some problems such as various schemes 
to cheat on the system. But, overall the system should have appeal 
17 
to the Congress and others. Although consumers would be hit with slightly 
higher food prices, the government program cost could be fai ly small. 
Consumer costs will be discussed later. 
In review, the basic options for a solution to the problem are few. 
There can be government price or income supports. Or, there can be 
demand expansion, or there can be supply contraction, or production adjust-
ment. There is no magic. The government cannot, without cost, make a 
declaration which cures the problem. There is no easy way out. There 
are some hard ways out. Basic understanding of the foregoing should help 
us avoid these pitfalls. 
. , 
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I would like to suggest a modification of the Il product ion adjustment ll 
feature of SB 2626. As the proposal stands, each producer would be 
required to reduce his size of enterprise. So much of our system depends 
on large-scale operations that this would quite seriously hamper effi-
ciency of production. The proposal would be strengthened by having a 
Ilbankingll system. This would improve the efficiency by facilitating 
transfers of production cuts or production rights among farmers. Ineffi-
cient farmers could benefit by selling their production allocation to 
more efficient operators or to those who might ~ave a machinery comple-
ment exactly matched to their acreage. Efficient operators could 
continue to use thier management and other resources to produce goods at 
low cost. 
My recommendation is that the Agricultural St abilization and 
Conservation Service Office in each county be authorized to facilitate 
transactions by acting as an intermediary among buyers and sellers. Bids 
and offerings would establish the price. Of course, this provision 
would require establishment, or maintenance, of a normal yield base to 
serve as the basis for transfer of production rights. Increased freedom 
to choose the manner and size of operation would result from the banking 
scheme. 
The entire production adjustment provision does limit the freedom 
of fa rm opera tors. On the other hand, gri ndi ng poverty is an even more 
serious constraint. My judgment is that a production management system 
is advantageous to farmers and consumers alike, if there is a long-term 
commitment . It is necessary for a stable, viable food-producing system. 
• I 
Other General Comments 
Farmers "deserve" 100 percent of parity. There is no basis in 
history, equity, or efficiency for this contention. The original party 
concept was to compare receipts from farming with costs of production 
based on the average levels of costs and income for each conrnodity 
based on the average levels of costs and income for each commodity in 
19 
the period 1910-14. Revisions have been attempted in the base period, 
but the problems remain. The methods of production change; the economies 
of scale increase in importance, and the comparison is no longer valid. 
A farm price of product and inputs is measured, but no mention is made 
of the greatly increased volume that a single producer can generate. 
And, parity ignores the changes in quantities of various inputs purchased 
by a farmer. Thus, they measure only a comparison of prices for an 
outdated set of factors of production and prices of commodities produced. 
Perhaps a more useful concept would be a measure of parity or equitability 
of incomes ~ farmer with other occupations as of right now. 
An increase of farm prices of 30 to 50 percent would cause an infla-
tion rate of 6, 8, or 10 percent per year. Some high-placed analysts 
have made such statements. It seems impossible. In the first place, an 
increase would bea one-time event. Thus, it is not a rate of inflation 
which implies a repetitive annual increment to the problem. A one-time 
rise in prices for farm products would result in the same expenditure by 
consumers buying fewer goods, or a larger expenditure to buy the same 
goods. This by definition is a price inflation, but it is a one-time 
occurence. Now, how much would this one-time inflation amount to? 
______________________________________________________ _______ • _____ f ______________ • __ ~ ... 
• I 
Take the following figures. Assume a farm price increase of 50 percent. 
The farmer's share of the consumer food dollar is about 35 percent. 
Consumers spend about 18 percent of their income on food. Thus, with 
the price rise at the farm level of 50 percent the appropriate estimate 
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of inflation (as measured by Consumer Price Index) is 0.50 X 0.35 X 0.18 = 
0.032, or a one-time 3 percent increment that would be attributable to 
a very large increase in farm prices. If lack of competition in the 
marketing channel leads to larger food price increases being passed to 
consumers, these increases should not be attributed to the farm price. 
There would be a large decline in gross national product and wide-
spread unemployment if farm prices were increased sharply. Apparently, 
there has been a case of neglect or forgetfulness by some ana-Iysts. 
Clearly, a boost in agricultural .incomes would result in increases in 
employment and in expeditures and investment by the farm sector. This 
increase would be magnified by the multiplied effect of these farm i nput 
suppliers making further investments and expenditures. Our evidence is 
that farm sector expenditure multipliers are as high or higher as any-
where else in the economy. Thus, we would expect that decreases in eco~ 
nomic activity due to a fall in expenditures in non-farm goods would be 
offset by an increase in economic activity associated with agriculture. 
We should expect some decrease in economic activity because of higher 
farm prices and slightly fewer consumer dollars to spend on other goods. 
But, a reasonable price rise should not provoke any catastrophe. 
Consumers object to any increase in food prices. There are indica-
tions that consumers have a lot of sympathy for farmers' plight. But the 
support is limited depending on the extent of impact on the consumer 
pocketbook. In Table 4, the results show general sympathy; but when 
consumer costs are increased up to 10 percent, then the support wanes. 
Of course, any ra i se of as much as 50 percent a t the fa rm ccul d be 
expected to increase food costs by more than 10 percent . According to 
our earlier calculations, it would be about 17 percent (0.50 X 0.35 = 
0.17). Of course, the usual pattern is for the marketing channels to 
tack on a constant percentage, but lack of a competitive system in the 
marketing cna1t be assessed to farmers. 
The Harris Poll indicates that a 5 percent increase in food prices 
would be acceptable to a majority. A 10 percent increase would not. 
So the question of public support is met with a mixed reaction for 
an answer. Only can it be said that agriculture seems to have more 
support than has been the case sometimes in the past. 
Some Final Comments 
A few things seem to be evident in reviewing goals and the nature 
of the problems and possible solutions. We would list the following: 
1. It would be prudent and useful to establish a stockpile which 
would not be regarded as burdensome surplus, but as a useful buffer and 
insurance. This can be afforded. 
2. Farmers are in difficulty. Some worse than others; a few have 
no problem at all. But, the general sitution is that they have done 
their job so well for us all (and due to the nature of the industry), 
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they have dug a pit for themselves. We assert that some help is warranted 
to maintain a stable and lively industry. 
I 
I·. 
\: 
t 
(" 
t:, 
"Table Publ ic SUP;;O}~t for Raising Fa rill Prices Depending on the Effect on Food Price to Consumers 
Political Philosophy Political Par ty 
Conser- t~ i dd 1 e Lib - Demo- Repu b- Inde-
Total vative of road eral cra t lican pendent 
t'/ou l d yOu favo t- ~lVlrl~ farmers 100 o f P ~ \- i t y i f '~ ha t ~ r I a b 1 1=.' d ~ I~ e r.l to III a V. e e r i rj S In ~ e ~ ? 
Favor 73. 6 72.3 73.0 76. 1 76 . 6 71 .8 71 .3 
Oppose 15.4 18.8 15.7 13.9 1 2. 1 18.8 19 . 7 
not sure 10.9 8.9 11 . 3 9.9 11 . 3 9.4 9.0 
~;ould you favor giving the f armers 100~ of parity if that raised your food costs 5 ~ ? 
Favor 53.7 
Oprose ');' _ I ...J • 
:Iot SJr 2 ~ l~ . ,_ 
53.2 
'3.7 .? 
g. " 
55.3 
31.7 
! 1\ 
53.2 50.6 
3~ " ..... . '" r 27 . ,0 
i ( .. _ -r 11. r, 
58.6 
-:: 1 7 
" . .' I • , 
9 . 7 
~, 6. 7 
3-~, . G 
~ . / 
'~ ;oulc. you favor giving ~f-)e fan rl ers 100~, of pa~' i:y if that t~aised your food costs 10 ' ? 
::-Jv o: ' lC "') I _~ • L 18. ; 17 . ~i 22 . 8 16 . 2 22 . 7 ~S .5 
Oppose 68.3 68. 1 69 . 7 66.7 71.8 64.9 67 . 7 
iJot sure 12 . 6 13 . ~ 12.7 10.5 12 . 0 12 .4 i2.C5 
Voted For 
Ford Carter 
c8.7 74.0 
22 . 2 15.5 
9. 1 1().5 
c: ~ }: 
_',...J . -....J 52 .8 
-: h ~r- . 2 
," 
I 
'L:.7 1/ . 4 
71 .9 68 .1 
7.3 14.5 
Source: Louis HZlrris and Assoc~utes Poll of ~239 r-esponden-ts quoted in Doane's Agricultural Report, 
Vol. 41 No. 8-1, February 24, 1978. N 
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3. Various forms of help are possible. We think it advisable to 
minimize direct government payments while facilitating a mechanism of 
supply control. However, farmers themselves, because of their large 
number, cannot manage this in a voluntary way. 
4. The productive capacity of agriculture is too great to let it 
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go unleashed. Too many will suffer from the great burdens of overproduc-
tion. There will be too great a risk of the system's self-destructing. 
Agriculture cannot compete unfettered in an economy where other sectors 
can manage production. 
5. Demand expansion has little potential. Continued efforts may 
be worthwhile, but his is not the basic solution. 
6. Parity is a poor measure of equity to agriculture. It is not 
very useful. It seems evident that an increase of price of agricultural 
commodities to 100 percent of parity would create too urgent of signals 
for the system to produce more. Land values would be inflated. It 
would also cause consumer protest, although the effect on consumer 
expenditures would be less than some would have us believe. 
7. We suggest a program designed to bring agricultural incomes up 
only part way to what would be implied by the advocates of 100 percent of 
parity. An immediate sharp increase all the way to parity would cause 
too much stress in the livestock industry and to consumers, and to foreign 
ma rkets. 
8. Probably none of us would choose to have even infrequent serious 
shortages of food in preference to over-production prob}ems. Let us 
take appropriate steps to stablize and provide for a viable, long-term 
productive agriculture. Legislation of help to agriculture is immediately 
needed. 
